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British and German pharmaceutical companies during 1990 and 2001 and 
explores the changing balance between globalisation and national 
embeddedness. It tries to explain both the much lower degree of globalisation of 
German as compared to British companies in 1990, as well as their catching up 
at the beginning of the 21st century. The paper suggests that the lesser degree of 
globalisation of German firms during most of the 1990s partly explains their 
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for the future of firms in both economies. The paper draws on detailed industry 
data, as well as case studies of the major firms in the two national industries.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
It is widely held that globalisation creates multiple attachments for 
multinational companies (MNCs) to foreign as well as domestic national 
institutional environments, which weakens domestic embeddedness and 
implantation into national policy networks. At the same time, it is realised that 
the extent of such disembedding depends on the degree of cohesion of the 
national business system and the differential way in which that system fosters 
the development of factors of production. In this respect a contrast between 
deeply embedded German firms, reliant on domestic provision of factors of 
production, and more isolated and autonomous British firms has been presented 
in the literature (Whitley 1999; Lane 1998 and 2000; Schmidt 2002). These 
different degrees of institutional embeddedness/autonomy have at least in part 
influenced the globalisation strategies that companies in these two economies 
have adopted. Whereas British firms internationalised relatively early (from the 
late 1970s onwards), German firms did so more hesitantly and much later (from 
the late 1980s onwards). But this picture of uneven progress by German 
companies on the road to becoming globally oriented firms has begun to change 
since the mid-1990s.  
 
These circumstances raise the following questions:  
 
1. Where were the two sets of national firms located on the continuum 
between highly globalised and locally embedded firms in 1990, and what 
factors can explain their different placement?   
 
2. How has this been changing during the last decade?  How has the dramatic 
increase in outward FDI by large firms in both countries (UNCTAD 2001, 
tables III.1 and III.5) affected the balance between national embeddedness 
and disembedding?  
 
3. Do German firms adopt a different path to globalisation as compared with 
UK firms, or do they simply follow the British pattern with a considerable 
time delay?   
 
4. What are the connections between globalisation and competitiveness? Has 
the different speed of globalisation of each national set of firms affected 
the degree of competitiveness of specific industries in each country?  
 
To answer these questions, we are undertaking a comparative review of the 
largest firms in the pharmaceutical/biotechnology industry of each country at 
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the two points in time. The focus on the pharmaceutical industry is motivated by 
two of its features. First, it is regarded as one of the most highly globalised 
industries. Firms in this industry need large markets to recoup high R&D costs. 
Access to new knowledge, which is more developed in some countries than in 
others, is an additional driver of globalisation. Further, more or less stringent 
regulatory approval is required for each of the countries outside the EU where 
firms aim to market their products. Hence the pharmaceutical industry may 
serve as a limiting case in answering some of the above questions. It will show 
whether the recent acceleration of FDI has virtually eliminated the impact of 
firms’ national origin, or whether, in such a highly globalised industry, a degree 
of national embeddedness remains important, even for the traditionally more 
detached UK firms. 
 
The second reason for choosing this industry has been that a German-British 
comparison poses an intriguing puzzle. A highly successful British industry 
with high R&D spending, in an otherwise unsuccessful manufacturing sector 
with R&D spending below the European average (Matraves 1997), may be 
contrasted with a German industry with an illustrious past (Keck 1993: 126) 
which is part of a more successful manufacturing sector that is losing 
competitiveness. More particularly, the German pharmaceutical industry has 
been losing out vis-à-vis its British rival in Europe since the early 1990s, both in 
terms of market share and innovativeness. The question addressed in this paper 
therefore is whether loss of competitiveness in the German industry is 
connected with the lesser degree of globalisation of its firms and, vice versa, 
whether British success can be ascribed at least in part to earlier 
internationalisation. Such an analysis also puts into perspective often 
exaggerated claims about British pharmaceuticals as ‘a beacon of excellence’ 
(e.g. Vitols 2001) and permits a more sober assessment of both the current and 
future contribution of this industry to the well-being of the British economy.  
 
The paper utilises case studies of all the major companies in the two industries 
in 2001 ranked by turnover, thus making it possible to generalise to the whole 
industry. (We include all firms incorporated in or with operational headquarters 
in Britain and Germany during most of the decade or so covered, that produce 
prescription drugs or develop platform technologies and have a turnover of at 
least £300 million). The list of companies studied for this paper is given in table 
2. By extending our investigation beyond merely the two or three giants in each 
national industry to include other firms of significant size, we are able to present 
a more comprehensive and balanced picture than is often provided. The case 
studies of firms in 2001 draw on data from company web sites and various 
company financial data bases, as well as on reports by industry associations and 
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financial analysts, and some other secondary sources. These data are compared 
with information for the same companies in 1990, which draws on similar 
sources but achieves a less complete data set.  
 
We adopt a dual definition of globalisation that considers both its financial and 
its economic dimension: 1. insertion into and exposure to international financial 
markets; and 2. company operations and activity in all major world markets for 
pharmaceutical products. A company’s degree of financial globalisation is 
assessed by looking at the ownership structure of firms, their mode of growth 
and their exposure to pressures from both domestic and foreign institutional 
investors. To gauge economic globalisation, the following three indicators have 
been adopted: the proportion of foreign employment as a proxy for the extent of 
foreign operations; the number of countries in which the firm has sites as a 
proxy for global dispersion; and the proportion of sales achieved in the US, 
Japan and the rest of the world (RoW) as a proxy for global reach.  
 
II. The Two Industries Compared 
 
The German and British pharmaceutical industries have very different histories. 
In Germany, the large chemical–pharmaceutical firms have their origins in the 
19th century (Keck 1993: 126), were very early adopters of a science-based 
approach to production and, due to a bank-based financial system, have had an 
almost uninterrupted existence since then. (Pharmaceuticals, however, were a 
relatively small part of the product portfolio of the three giants until the early 
1990s (Becker 2001: 92)). In contrast, their British counterparts date back 
mostly to the 1920s and 1930s or, if biotechnology firms, the 1980s and 1990s. 
Historically, they entered much later into large-scale industrial R&D and have 
had discontinuous development during recent decades, reflecting their greater 
orientation to the stock market. The two industries appear to be of similar size, 
measured in value of production, although the market value of sales was 
significantly higher in Germany in 2001 (EFPIA 2002: 14).  
 
At the current time, a first striking difference between the two sets of firms is 
the divergent degree of capital concentration and the ownership structure of all 
but the giant firms in the industry. Different financial systems and divergences 
in the patterns of ownership and control have led to different modes of firm 
growth and extent of size polarization (Figure 1). The large British firms have a 
very high concentration of capital and only two giants – GSK and AstraZeneca 
– now dominate the industry. In 2000, GSK ranked first and AstraZeneca fourth 
in terms of world market share in pharmaceuticals (Becker 2001: 108). Since 
other firms are comparatively small, the British pharmaceutical industry has a 
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highly polarized structure. The German industry has a lower degree of capital 
concentration and an absence of the size polarization that characterises the 
British industry. A German market concentration rate for the top ten of 38.35 
per cent in 1999 contrasts with a UK rate of 49.13 per cent (Gambardella et al 
2000:25, table 8). (The divestment, in 2000, by BASF of its pharmaceutical 
subsidiary will have reduced the German rate o f concentration further and 
widened the difference between the two countries’ industries). Although the 
German chemical-pharmaceutical giants are also very large they have grown 
more organically over a very long period. The German industry also contains a 
number of large, often family-owned, firms that have sufficient size to be or to 
become independent global players. All German companies have remained 
loyal to one locality over their long history – another contrast with UK firms, 
whose mergers have led to the closure or downgrading in importance of some 
sites.  
 
Firms in both countries previously had a mixed product portfolio consisting, in 
different combinations, of chemicals of various kinds, lower-tech health 
products/foods, and patented and generic pharmaceuticals. Traditionally their 
degree of diversification has been high. British firms (e.g. Glaxo in the 1980s 
and ICI in 1993) began to de-diversify significantly earlier than German ones. 
Divergences in forms of corporate governance and in the ensuing degree of 
pressure from investors have led in the British case to a stronger and earlier 
concentration on the high-margined prescription pharmaceutical segment (Froud 
et al 1998).  
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Figure 1: Annual sales of German and British pharmaceutical firms, 2001 
 
Another significant difference in the national institutional framework lies in the 
role of the state in shaping the competitive environment of firms in this 
industry. The British state has since the late 1950s provided strong incentives 
for inward investment by foreign pharmaceutical firms, oriented particularly to 
those that are prepared to locate parts of their R&D function in Britain (Thomas 
1994; Gambardella et al 2000). It has thus created a more challenging 
competitive environment, eliminating the smaller and weaker firms and forcing 
the survivors to become more attuned to international competitive standards 
(ibid). No other British manufacturing industry benefited from similar policies 
to encourage international competitiveness (cf. the detrimental effect on the 
competitiveness of the UK computer industry of the government’s ‘Buy British’ 
requirement for the public services’ IT needs (Owen, 1994)). The policy worked 
well in the pharmaceutical industry because it was administered via the 
Pharmaceuticals Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS), negotiated between the 
Department of Health and ABPI, the industry association. The PPRS regulates 
the cost of medicines supplied to the National Health Service, the UK’s tax-
funded medical system, by allowing companies to set their own prices but 
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capping the rate of profit they make on sales to the NHS. Calculation of profits 
considers investments undertaken, including those in R&D. Higher allowable 
profit margins are the reward for investment in UK-based R&D. The German 
state also allows companies freedom in drug pricing at launch, but it introduced 
a reference pricing system in 1989 that covers two-thirds of the pharmaceutical 
market and fixes reimbursement levels at the average price of cheaper drugs in 
the same therapeutic class (Jacobzone, 2000). In recent years it has also 
introduced regulations and incentives that steer doctors and pharmacists towards 
cheaper generic drugs. Such a pricing system not only keeps down profit levels 
but, significantly, provides no incentive for a high level of domestically based 
investment in R&D. There is additionally a 16 per cent VAT charge on 
prescription drugs, whereas drugs in Britain are VAT-free. British-based firms 
are seen to benefit from the differential pricing system, the indirect subsidy it 
provides for R&D, and the tax policy (Froud et al 1998; VfA 2001), and the 
stability and consistency of the PPRS over the last 40 years has also been an 
advantage (Owen, 1994). 
 
The degree of international competitiveness of the two industries has differed 
over time. German firms have usually been world leaders in exports and have 
had an excellent record in R&D and product innovation. But their performance 
has declined during the 1990s, and British firms began to outperform their 
German competitors in crucial respects. British firms’ share of the world market 
has increased between 1989 and 1999, whereas that of German firms has 
declined in the same period but still remains larger (Gambardella et al 2000:31). 
The large British firms invest more in R&D (in 2000, 32.5 per cent more, 
according to the EFPIA (2002: 18)). Between 1995 and 1999, their share of the 
top 50 new chemical entities was double that of German companies 
(Gambardella et al 2000: 33), and in 2001 they had a significantly higher share 
of the world’s top 75 prescription drugs – 20.3 per cent versus 2.7 per cent 
(ABPI 2002: 3). Their advantage in the field of innovation is reflected in a 
significantly larger number of so-called blockbuster drugs in their product 
portfolios. The competitive slide of the German pharmaceutical industry is 
evident in the fate of Bayer – now its largest firm. Bayer, ranked 12th among the 
world’s leading manufacturers of pharmaceuticals in 1995, was no longer in the 
top 15 companies by 2001 (IMS Health data), in part due to leapfrogging by 
other firms merging with rivals.  
 
Last, Britain has a number of biotechnology firms, which, although not yet 
financially very secure, are older, larger and said to be more involved in 
therapeutic drugs research than in the development of platform technologies that 
most German firms favour (Kettler and Casper, 2000). There is as yet no well-
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established German counterpart for companies like Celltech, Cambridge 
Antibody and Vernalis.  
 
III. Companies’ Degree of Globalisation at the Beginning of the 1990s 
 
Historically and up to the mid-1990s, German pharmaceutical firms were much 
less globalised than their British counterparts. Financial globalisation hardly 
existed, and insider control seemed well entrenched. Even some large firms 
were not yet listed on the stock market and those that were had few foreign 
investors in general and institutional investors in particular. (For details, see 
Lane 2003.) Insider control traditionally has included control also by labour 
representatives on companies’ supervisory boards. Although labour has not 
opposed globalisation tout court its company representatives seek to prevent 
overseas activity if it involves substitution for domestic activity and 
employment, rather than their expansion. They also tend to oppose any 
divestment or relocation out of Germany or, at least, seek to gain compensation 
for any loss of employment. Hoechst discovered how costly such a 
reorganisation strategy can be, when, as a consequence of its merger with 
Rhone-Poulenc in 1999, it had to lay off a large number of highly-qualified 
employees for whom the works council negotiated generous compensation 
packages.  
 
The economic globalisation of German firms was well under way by the early 
1990s, but was much less advanced than for large British firms. Both global 
reach and global dispersion of operations were relatively low. German firms 
remained strongly Europe-oriented in terms of exports and in the location of 
their subsidiaries. Domestic employment mostly remained higher than foreign 
employment, and the internationalisation of R&D was comparatively low. 
 
Both the financial and the economic globalisation of large British firms during 
the early 1990s were much more advanced. All reasonably sized firms were 
quoted on the stock market, and their highly dispersed share holdings left them 
vulnerable to takeover or control by outsiders. It is, however, much harder to 
provide statistical comparison with the picture in 2001. Few of the firms 
currently in the industry existed in 1990 in their present form. The two current 
giants were five separate firms in the early 1990s (Glaxo, Wellcome, and the 
Anglo-American company SmithKline Beecham, which together now comprise 
GSK; and Zeneca, the pharmaceuticals business spun out from ICI in 1993, 
together with Astra of Sweden making up AstraZeneca). Smaller firms 
(Amersham, Shire and Celltech) also existed in 1990 in a radically different 
form from today and had not yet reached a scale to be globally active. Shire 
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Pharmaceuticals – now Britain’s fourth largest drugs company – for example, 
was founded only in 1986 and has grown to its current size only via seven 
acquisitions in the six years up to 2001. In 1995 it employed only 80 people 
worldwide. Hence the comparison of sales and employment dispersion 
presented in Table 1 focuses on only the larger firms at that time – Glaxo, 
Wellcome, SmithKline Beecham and ICI. Glaxo, in 1990, was already strongly 
US-focused, had internationally dispersed R&D sites, and employed more 
people abroad than at home.  
 
Table 1: German and British pharmaceutical firms in 1990 
 
a) Turnover (%) 
  
BASF* 
 
Bayer 
 
Hoechst 
Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
 
Fresenius 
 
Merck KG 
Germany  34 23 25 51 27 
Rest of Europe 67 25 35 31 23 40 
All of Europe 67 59 58 56 74 67 
 
  
Glaxo+ 
 
ICI 
SmithKline 
Beecham 
 
Wellcome 
UK 12 23 11 33 
Rest of Europe 33 26 27 23 
All of Europe 45 49 38 46 
 
b) Employment (%) 
  
BASF* 
 
Bayer 
 
Hoechst 
Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
 
Fresenius 
 
Merck KG 
Germany 64 37 53 39 63 40 
Rest of Europe 14 33 19 22 15 26 
All of Europe 78 70 72 61 78 66 
 
  
Glaxo+ 
 
ICI 
SmithKline 
Beecham 
 
Wellcome 
UK 39 41 19 37 
Rest of Europe n.a. 13 21 13 
All of Europe n.a. 54 40 50 
 
* BASF sold its pharmaceutical operations in 2000-1. 
+ Pharmaceuticals and foods division. 
Source: For Germany, adapted from Becker 2001, p.153, 155, 156; for Britain, annual reports. 
 
What were the reasons for this Anglo-German difference in the level of firm 
globalisation? How can the marked lag on the part of German firms be 
explained? The foremost explanation to date has pointed to their greater degree 
of local and regional embeddedness (cf. Lane 1998). A greater reliance on 
access to national tangible and intangible factors of production and on risk 
sharing in national innovation and inter-firm networks (both direct and mediated 
by associations) are important factors, as well as greater constraints experienced 
from labour. Additionally, the more limited use of the stock market by German 
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companies and resulting forms of corporate governance underlay both the lack 
of pressure and the opportunity to internationalise on a large scale. The resulting 
greater presence of firms with family majority ownership in particular has 
curtailed expansion beyond the point where the family would lose control. More 
generally, external growth through large-scale merger and acquisition to gain 
globally competitive size has been the exception (the Hoechst case), rather than 
the rule in the German pharmaceutical industry.1 As indicated above, the British 
stock market-based system has had the opposite effect on UK firms’ growth 
strategy.  
 
Yet this explanation alone of the differing degree of British and German firms’ 
globalisation in 1990 is too simple and cannot fully explain the national 
differences in firms’ patterns of globalisation. It is too simple because, in this 
industry, close relations with the state and the system of health provision are 
vital in both countries. As shown earlier in this section, close firm-state relations 
exist to negotiate cost structures and drug approval systems. In addition firms 
may receive indirect support from the state for R&D, and they are reliant on the 
state’s structuring of the national health system as well as being exposed to its 
competition policy.  
 
The ‘embeddedness’ thesis also offers an insufficient explanation. Additional 
explanatory factors need to be considered to explain German firms’ lag on the 
road to globalisation, as well as the early start of their British counterparts. One 
important reason has been historical. Whereas Britain’s past possession of an 
empire and the use of pounds sterling as an international currency favoured 
British firms’ early internationalisation, Germany’s loss of two world wars 
drastically disrupted its firms’ internationalisation endeavours. As part of 
reparations after WWI, German companies lost all their assets and patents in the 
US, UK and France (Corley 1999/2000; Keck 1993: 126). In the US, they even 
lost their trade names when subsidiaries of Merck and Schering became the 
eponymous US firms. This setback caused many German firms to prefer an 
export strategy towards internationalisation and to delay embarking on foreign 
direct investment until much later than comparable British companies. A final 
explanatory factor is that German firms have a larger home market and occupy a 
larger share of it than do British counterparts in their home market; hence they 
remain more reliant on it for sales (EFPIA 2001; EFPIA 2002).  
 
IV. Acceleration of Globalisation in the German Industry 
 
The picture of German firms as laggards on the road to globalisation began to 
change from the mid-1990s onwards, and accelerated globalisation is an 
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appropriate way to describe the process of change. While this applies to German 
firms in many industries, it has been particularly pronounced in the 
pharmaceutical sector. (See foreign investment statistics in UNCTAD 2001, 
tables III.1 and III.5). 
 
The reasons for change are connected both with new opportunities and new 
constraints. Cost pressures from rising R&D expenditure translate into pressure 
to enlarge market opportunities. The large size of the US market, together with 
the clear leadership of US firms in the biotechnology segment and in innovation 
more generally, makes presence in this market obligatory for firms with global 
aspirations. The importance of obtaining regulatory approval from the FDA is 
an additional reason for establishing sites in the US. Hence German firms have 
had to move away from their Euro-centricity and strengthen their presence in 
the US, both in terms of manufacturing sites or R&D laboratories, and in terms 
of sales. Entry into the Japanese market and that of the rest of the world (RoW) 
has been much slower.  
 
In light of these changes, have German firms caught up with British firms in 
their degree of globalisation, or are there still significant differences at the 
beginning of the 21st century? Are the responses of German firms to global 
pressures qualitatively different, or do they simply constitute a delayed response 
in comparison with the globalisation strategies of British companies?  
 
To answer these questions, we first examine the two sets of national firms in 
terms of their degree of financial globalisation. It is no exaggeration to say that 
the large British firms owe their current dominant status worldwide to financial 
globalisation: they have depended on financial markets for their growth and 
globalisation strategy. The four largest – GSK, AstraZeneca, Shire and 
Amersham – have expanded through sizeable multiple acquisitions during the 
1990s. This fact has shaped their mode of corporate governance. All firms, 
including the smaller ones (in terms of turnover and employees), are strongly 
reliant on how their shares are valued on the stock market. Their relatively 
dispersed ownership makes them vulnerable to the threat of takeover from other 
British or foreign companies, although GSK and Astra Zeneca now are perhaps 
too large to become targets. 
 
In Germany, financial globalisation has progressed markedly since the late 
1990s (O’Sullivan 2001; Hoepner 2001; Lane 2003), but it has not yet had 
nearly the same salience as it has for British companies. Stock market listing is 
not yet as important as it is for British pharmaceutical companies, and instances 
of external growth through acquisition, to attain global status, have been 
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infrequent. Financial globalisation has nevertheless been important for both 
restructuring and growth. Thus the transformation of Hoechst and its eventual 
merger with Rhone Poulenc of France to form Aventis depended entirely on 
stock market quotation and the opportunity it provided both to raise large 
amounts of capital and to swap shares. Also the restructuring of both Bayer and 
BASF into business divisions occurred in response to investor pressures. 
Several smaller companies and family- or foundation-owned firms, with the 
exception of Boehringer Ingelheim, have listed on the DAX or on foreign 
markets during the last few years, usually to support a strategy of external 
expansion. Most have now made acquisitions. Thus, Altana achieved listing on 
the DAX and the NYSE in 2002, and the company explicitly linked its NYSE 
listing with expansion plans in the US (Annual Report 2002). Schering, too, 
started to acquire US companies after listing on the NYSE in 2000. External 
growth has for the most part been fairly modest, with the exception of 
Fresenius. Its growth through acquisition in the US resulted in around a 
sevenfold increase in turnover and employment between 1990 and 1997 (Becker 
2001: 235). 
  
Yet exposure to the market for corporate control applies only to a few 
companies, particularly Bayer and, to a lesser extent, Hoechst/Aventis. 
Attention to foreign investors, in terms of investor relations and the formal 
aspects of observing shareholder value, looms large in both companies, and the 
restructuring first of Hoechst and then Aventis has been a classic case of 
following the dictates of investors (Becker 2001). All privately owned firms 
have taken care to preserve family/foundation majority control. Thus, in the 
cases of Merck KGaA, Fresenius, Schwarz and Altana, the family/foundation 
retains between 51 and 75 per cent of share capital, and family members are 
active in corporate governance. 
 
The different degree and pattern of economic globalisation of British and 
German companies, shown in Table 2, reveal complexities that make 
comparison more difficult. 
 
The data are difficult to interpret because both sets of firms show intra-country 
differences, depending on company history and size. It is nevertheless clear that 
German firms have in many ways caught up and are now similar to their British 
counterparts on several indicators of economic globalisation.  
 
British firms, nevertheless, remain more globalised. This is particularly evident 
in a comparison of the two national giants – German Bayer and British GSK. 
Bayer is still a Europe-centred company, with a relatively low level of global 
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dispersion of its activities and employment, and it has retained a diversified 
business portfolio, with only one-third of sales derived from healthcare. Its 
board has remained solidly German, and Bayer’s attachment to its century-long 
base in Leverkusen remains strong for all operations. GSK, in contrast, is highly 
globalised on all indicators in the table. It now has its operational HQ in the US, 
and its board membership reflects this strong US-centrism, yet the company 
remains registered in the UK, where it also has its primary stock market listing. 
The R&D function also is highly US-focused although the firm also remains 
one of the three largest investors in research in the UK, together with 
AstraZeneca and Pfizer (ABPI, 2003).  
 
The comparative evaluation of the extent of globalisation is more difficult for 
the other two giants – Aventis (Hoechst) and AstraZeneca, both of which were 
formed from mergers with a European partner and hence have remained more 
Europe-centred organisations. Yet North America dominates the sales 
breakdown for AstraZeneca (55%), whereas Aventis has greater sales in the rest 
of the world (RoW). In both cases, the board of directors is bi-national (at least), 
giving representation to members from both merger partners. Aventis has 
loosened its ties with Germany, having placed its legal headquarters in France 
(albeit near the German border) and appointed a US-based executive as head of 
discovery research. The German market is now its third largest, behind the US 
and France. Nevertheless, reliance on the German research infrastructure and 
human resources still is significant; Frankfurt remains the main research site for 
several therapeutic categories; and new costly facilities are still being opened in 
Germany (e.g. a genomics research facility in Munich and a new insulin-
producing plant). The company also has adopted a system of employee 
representation similar to the German system of co-determination. AstraZeneca 
is more Europe-centred than Aventis in terms of locations and employment, and 
less so in terms of sales. Its embeddedness in Britain appears less strong since 
its R&D headquarters is in Sweden, even though its legal headquarters is in 
London. Its accounts are denominated in US dollars, reflecting the importance 
of its US institutional shareholders. 
 
When we then focus on the smaller firms the picture is more varied, depending 
on size and age. The starker internal differences in Britain than in Germany 
reflect the greater size polarisation.  
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Table 2: Indicators of Globalisation: German and British Pharmaceutical 
Firms in 2001 
 
 
Company
Sales      
(£ mill.) Employment
No. of sites in 
no. of countries
No. of R&D 
sites
Geographical 
spread of sales 
(%)
German
Aventis 
(Hoechst)
10,958 68 74,931 48 44 countries 
>120 sites; 
R&D/ mfg in 22 
non-Eur 
countries
3 sites, 1 in US N.America 39  
Japan 6 RoW 
19
High in all 
respects
Bayer* 6,096 60+ 41,700 45+ sites in 100 
countries
4 main sites N.America 33  
AsiaPac 16    
RoW 11
Medium-
high, sales 
still Europe-
centric
Fresenius 4,538 69 60,667 60 sites in 100 
countries, 16 
main mfg sites 
w/wide
US 56     
AsiaPac 11    
RoW 17
High
Boehringer 
Ingelheim
4,150 69 27,980 46 sites in 42 
countries 
8 sites in 7 
countries/3 
regions
N.America 52  
RoW 17
High in sales, 
lower in 
employ't
Schering 3,002 55 25,556 38 28 subsids. 14 
in Europe
9 sites in 
Europe, US & 
Japan
US 23        
Japan 14  RoW 
18  
Low
Merck KG* 2,060 57 34,294+ 45+ 192 sites in 55 
countries+
6 sites in 5 
countries
N.America 31  
AsiaPac 9     
RoW 17
Low-Medium
Altana* 986 46 6,867 56         
(outside 
Germany)
12 subsids in 12 
countries
2 sites, 1 in US N.America 26  
RoW 20
Low
Schwarz 
Pharma
476 32 3,428 26 17 subsids in 14 
countries
2 sites, I in US 
(development 
only)
US 30        
Asia 2
Low
British
Glaxo-
SmithKline
20,489 74 107,899 57 107 sites in 70 
countries
20 R&D sites, 
inc. 9 foreign
US 53        
Japan 4     
RoW 13
High
Astra-
Zeneca
10,986 68 52,600 43 marketing in 
>100,  mfg in 
20 countries
9 sites, 7 
abroad (major 
sites in 5)
Americas 58   
RoW  10
High
Amersham 2,206 61 9,500 38 >50 countries, 
mfg sites in 
Europe, US, 
Asia
7 main sites in 
4 countries
N.America 48  
Japan 18    
RoW 10
High in sales, 
lower in 
employ-ment
Shire 
Pharma-
ceuticals
580 74 (US) 1,677 Approx 80 14 sites in 9 
countries
2 (1 in US) US 74    
Internat'l (inc. 
UK) 26
Medium    
(US-focused)
Celltech 303 85 2,029 N.A. 10 main sites in 
7 countries
2 in UK, 1 in 
US
US  73        
RoW 12
Low
* Pharmaceutical/healthcare divisions only, except where indicated.
+ Entire company
Sources: Company annual reports 2001 & 2002; company websites; company presentations
Non-
European 
sales as % 
of total sales
Non-
European 
employ't as 
% of total 
employ't
Overall 
degree of 
globalisation
Note: Euros converted to sterling at €1 = £0.62; US$ at US$1 = £0.67 (AstraZeneca produces its accounts only in US $)
Spread of international activity
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Fresenius has greatly increased its non-European sales and employment through 
a number of US acquisitions, but has retained its headquarters and R&D centre 
in Bad Homburg, Germany. Both Boehringer Ingelheim and Merck KGaA have 
also spread their sales activities widely. Boehringer Ingelheim operates 
important R&D sites in the US and in Japan, but retains its main research 
facility in its home base at Ingelheim, Germany, where it recently invested 
heavily in a new administrative building (Becker 2001: 157). Merck KGaA, 
despite setting up a new research site and marketing and distribution centres in 
the US and Japan, similarly maintains its core activities in Darmstadt where it 
originated as an apothecary in 1668. In contrast, both Schering and, more so, 
Schwarz have a comparatively low global dispersion. Schering does generate 
high sales outside both Europe and the US (the relatively modest US sales 
reflecting the resolution only in 1988 of Schering’s legal problems with 
Schering-Plough over the use of the Schering name in the United States), 
whereas Schwarz remains firmly Europe-centred.  
 
The British second-tier companies are very much younger and smaller than their 
German counterparts. Although its origins date back to the 1940s, Amersham in 
1990 was still of small scale and very much UK-centred. A deliberate strategy 
of globalisation through acquisition led to mergers with two large European 
partners and many more smaller acquisitions. Although less strongly US-
focused in either operations or sales, its headquarters for biosciences is 
nevertheless located there. Shire retains a particularly low attachment to Britain, 
by virtue of its growth through serial US acquisitions, with most of its 
employees in the US and strong corporate control exerted by US non-executive 
directors. Celltech, founded in 1975, but existing in its present form since 1990, 
makes more than half of its sales in the US thanks to mergers in 1999 and 2000 
with two other British firms that had US operations. A laboratory in Seattle 
supplements its core research activities in the UK.  
 
The same willingness of the British firms to engage actively in mergers to 
expand their size and scope is evident in their use of alliances with 
biotechnology firms and research institutions that give the large firms right of 
first refusal over the discoveries made by their small partners. Often these 
agreements are entered into to fill gaps in R&D pipelines, and for the larger 
firms they represent a means of tapping into the flexibility and creativity of 
smaller innovative organisations. Here again UK firms’ behaviour has 
contrasted with that of the German firms, which traditionally have relied more 
heavily on in-house research, although the creative pull of American 
biotechnology firms has also begun to attract German interest. 
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Despite marked intra-country diversity between firms it is possible to make 
some generalisations. German firms have grown more similar to British ones in 
degree and route of economic globalisation, but they still differ in crucial 
respects. They tend to be better represented in non-US markets and activities, 
whereas British companies, with the exception of some of the smallest, remain 
predominantly US-focused. The R&D operations of German firms, although 
now more oriented towards developments in the US, have retained their main 
locus in Germany. They not only show a strong attachment to Germany for 
high-value functions but also to the towns in which they have been based for a 
century or more. Both supervisory and management boards, excepting the case 
of Aventis, remain almost solidly German. These features no longer apply to the 
larger UK firms. 
 
The biggest difference between German and UK firms lies in the area of 
financial globalisation. Whereas German firms largely have grown organically 
to their current large size and are only beginning to use international capital 
markets for their globalisation strategy, most British companies owe their very 
existence as global players to participation in financial markets.  
 
V. Globalisation and Performance 
 
In section II it was shown that there exists a clear performance deficit by the 
German pharmaceutical/biotechnology industry in terms of innovation and 
market share, as compared with its British counterpart. What, if any, are the 
connections between German delayed financial and economic globalisation and 
the German industry’s inferior performance? Why are British firms showing 
this uncharacteristically high performance?   
 
The British industry’s superior performance may be connected with earlier 
financial and economic globalisation, but firms in this industry also have 
enjoyed a number of advantages that flow from national embeddedness. They 
have benefited from a supportive pricing system instituted by the national state. 
This, together with a large captive client – the NHS – has ensured firms 
sufficient margins and security for some to choose to make high and long-term 
investments in R&D, thus remaining unaffected by the usual Anglo-American 
short-termism. Moreover, the design of state policy has rewarded research 
intensity. The capital market-based financial system has encouraged and 
facilitated both external growth and, in the last two decades, a greater 
concentration of business activity on high-margin ethical pharmaceuticals than 
is found in the German industry. Further, a developed capital market and the 
availability of venture capital (though to a much lesser extent than in the United 
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States) have favoured the relatively early creation of a biotechnology industry, 
encouraged also by more permissive state regulation of gene research than was 
the case in Germany. British firms have, of course, also benefited from a good 
domestic scientific base and an easier transfer of new knowledge from the 
academic world into medical application (Gambardella et al 2000), but this has 
not been a new development and hence it cannot explain the industry's spurt 
ahead from the late 1980s onwards.  
 
However earlier globalisation – economic and financial – of both the domestic 
economy and of British firms, fostered by state policy, has been an additional 
important contributory factor in superior competitiveness. The state’s early and 
successful encouragement of inward FDI has created a highly competitive 
domestic environment, constraining firms to grow and prosper or perish 
(Gambardella et al 2000). Outward FDI into the US from the late 1970s 
onwards has similarly been vital to the success of British companies. The giant 
US market, its excellent scientific base, its developed biotechnology industry, 
and its much faster growth throughout the 1990s than any other market in the 
world have had very positive consequences for the innovativeness and growth 
of British firms. Earlier financial globalisation has facilitated external growth 
through mega mergers and has enabled firms like GSK and Astra-Zeneca to 
penetrate and hold their own in the US market.  
 
The German firms, despite an earlier history of success in terms of their share of 
the world market and a continuing good export performance, have lost some of 
their competitive edge. They did not enjoy the same opportunities and 
constraints during the 1980s and first half of the 1990s as did British firms. A 
long-term perspective on investment into human capital and technology has 
proved insufficient in this industry to preserve competitive advantage. Less 
rapid responses to market demands and, above all, a lesser capacity for radical 
innovation, due to labour market and organisational rigidities and insufficient 
venture capital, are cited as the main explanations in the literature (e.g. Soskice 
1997; Casper et al 1999) for German firms’ recent loss of leadership. While 
their analysis offers a very plausible explanation of lower German 
innovativeness in this industry as a whole, it cannot explain the recent German 
loss in competitiveness in pharmaceuticals. This paper additionally has 
highlighted the impact of different state policies towards the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries, but above all has emphasised the effects of later 
financial and economic globalisation. In particular a less developed presence in 
the world’s largest and consistently fastest-growing market and their remoteness 
from the US knowledge base have undoubtedly had a negative effect on the 
German industry.  
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VI. Conclusions and Future Prospects 
 
This paper has reviewed the different patterns of globalisation of German and 
British firms in the pharmaceutical industry and has connected the lag on the 
road to globalisation up to the mid-1990s of German firms, as compared with 
British firms, with the recent loss of competitiveness of the German industry.  
 
Our review of companies’ international activities during the recent globalisation 
spurt in an already highly globalised industry has not supported the image of 
completely footloose transnational actors among either German or British 
companies. It is still possible to categorise companies by their national origin. 
Globalisation and national embeddedness, it has been shown, coexist in a 
complex mixture in both Britain and Germany. Reliance on state funding of 
health spending, on national regulatory policy in fields of health care and 
medicines and on indirect subsidy for R&D make for an industry which, 
although highly globalised, still depends strongly on the national state and on 
the health care and innovation systems it maintains. This applies not only to 
German companies, but is equally or even more true for British ones. (These 
same factors naturally also apply to foreign firms operating in the German and 
British markets.) 
 
British pharmaceutical companies have benefited more from state policy than 
companies in other sectors of British industry (excepting the defence industry), 
and they have derived greater advantage from this relation than their German 
counterparts. The state’s free market stance on inward FDI, coupled with a 
pricing policy, supportive of a high level of R&D expenditure, has served large 
British companies well. Historically it has given pharmaceutical companies in 
Britain the opportunity to earn a high rate of return, the lack of which has 
hampered the development of firms in other British manufacturing industries. 
The advent of NICE, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, and the 
resulting blight on sales to the NHS of products that are under evaluation, 
coupled with a more highly regulated environment for clinical trials than is the 
norm across Europe, may in the medium to longer term reduce the attractiveness 
of Britain as an investment site. German companies also have enjoyed a 
supportive domestic environment, but state policy on a variety of dimensions 
seems to have been less beneficial for firms than is the case in Britain. 
 
German companies have internationalised later and by the early 1990s had 
achieved more limited global dispersion and reach, while financial globalisation 
was not at all developed. Their much smaller presence in the important US 
market has been a particular factor. At the beginning of the 21st century, despite 
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much internal diversity, the degree of globalisation of German companies has 
become very similar to that of their British competitors. It could even be 
claimed that they have achieved a wider global dispersion and greater global 
reach than British companies, which have remained heavily focused on the US, 
although the alternative argument is that in so doing they are expending too 
many resources on less important and lower margin markets.  
 
But even after their recent globalisation spurt and the making up for lost ground, 
German companies have remained more nationally and even locally embedded. 
This is particularly evident in their continuing attachment to long-established 
home bases in particular provincial towns and their greater retention of high-
value functions in these bases. Also important is that family majority ownership 
of even very large companies endures and that, in all companies except for 
Aventis, internal control remains almost exclusively in German hands, as 
indicated by the composition of both management and supervisory boards. 
German multinational companies have become steadily more globally dispersed 
and more adept at combining national advantages for factor development with 
location advantages in foreign investment sites. Their increased reliance on US 
expertise in the area of R&D best illustrates this point.  
 
Globalisation of German firms thus may be described as both following the 
British pattern with a delayed response and, at the same time, preserving its sui 
generis character in seeking to combine advanced globalisation with continuing 
national embeddedness. German companies may be said to be following a 
similar trajectory not only in degree of economic globalisation but also in 
locational choices and adaptation of organisational structures (more product-
oriented, operationally independent but financially controlled business units 
(Becker 2001: 154)). The first response is very much shaped by the second. In 
Britain, in contrast, detachment from the home base has become more 
pronounced in recent years. It has been most evident in the case of GSK and 
Shire and slightly less so in the cases of AstraZeneca and Amersham.  
 
The later and more hesitant globalisation of German companies, as compared 
with their British counterparts, it has been argued, has had a decisive impact on 
industrial performance in the pharmaceutical industry. During the last two 
decades, a high degree of global dispersion and reach have been necessary, 
though not sufficient, for the attainment of international competitiveness. 
Particularly, location of operations in the US has been vital for three reasons. It 
has facilitated better access to this large market and has enabled the 
accumulation of the necessary resources to achieve external growth and high 
investment in R&D. Experience of managing operations in the US also has 
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supported the learning by British firms of aggressive marketing techniques, 
considered crucial for this industry. But, above all, earlier exposure to the US 
science base and its many successful biotechnology firms has afforded 
invaluable opportunities for learning from the world leader in both 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, through both scientific co-operation and in-
licensing of new drug discoveries.  
 
The catching up of German pharmaceutical firms on the road to globalisation 
would suggest that performance also is likely to improve during the coming 
decade. Any forecast in this respect needs to extrapolate from current trends and 
distinguish between different types of firm in both industries. Under-
performance has not been dramatic – the German industry is still the world’s 
largest exporter – and it has mainly affected the giants in the German industry. 
Its many solid large firms (Boehringer and Schering are counted among the 
world’s top 25 pharmaceutical companies) are far better equipped to succeed in 
terms of available resources for globalisation than the smaller and less secure 
British firms, like Shire and Celltech. Although GSK still possesses a promising 
drugs pipeline its post-merger troubles have disrupted the innovation process. 
Moreover, with its operational HQ already in the US and the relative 
unimportance of the British market, it is becoming increasingly detached from 
its British science base. AstraZeneca is predicted to lose market share with the 
expiry of the patent for its best-selling drug, Losec, in 2003. German second-
rung pharmaceutical companies, such as Boehringer, Schering, Merck KG and 
Fresenius, have performed well in most years during the 1990s (Becker 2001: 
139, 145-48) and should be able to secure the industry’s future. The case of 
Bayer is more problematic, as the firm considers whether its pharmaceutical 
operations have sufficient critical mass to continue, following the failure of one 
of its key drug prospects in 2002. Aventis now has a much reduced presence in 
and reliance on Germany, and it is debatable whether it should be counted as a 
German firm in the future.  
 
Also the German state’s recent nurture of a domestic biotech industry resulted 
in an upsurge in new biotech firms. It has more than 500 small independent 
firms dedicated to biotechnology, compared with around 450 in Britain 
(Allansdottir et al 2002: 32-33). Their increasing turnover and employment in 
recent years (Financial Times, 25 September 2000), together with the steep 
increase between 1997 and 2000 in new patent registrations from Germany 
based on biotechnological research (VfA 2001: 34), hold some promise for the 
industry’s future (Casper et al 1999), despite the painful collapse of many young 
firms when the technology boom ended. Although Britain has more-advanced 
biotech companies, the semi-detachment of its large pharmaceutical companies 
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deprives them of opportunities for nurture within supportive domestic networks 
(Gambardella et al 2000: 83-84). Moreover, their supposedly high concentration 
on radically innovative drug discovery (Soskice 1997; Kettler and Casper 2000) 
looks less impressive when it is realised that none of these firms so far have 
reached a significant level of profitability and some, such as Amersham, have 
chosen to divest their drug discovery assets. Last, although British firms were 
quick to colonise the lucrative US market, German firms are perhaps better 
prepared for entry to the Asian and Latin American world. 
 
Thus, to conclude, differences in the degree of both financial and economic 
globalisation will further diminish although German firms will be likely to 
continue to combine their internationalisation efforts with more pronounced 
domestic embeddedness in terms of access to knowledge and high-quality 
labour. Consequently, differences in innovation and competitive capacity also 
are likely to diminish, if not disappear. This will be partly, but not solely, as a 
consequence of German firms’ stronger positive responses to opportunities to 
globalise, as well as to a greater propensity to seize them, due to increased 
pressures from a changed financial system and forms of corporate governance.  
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Notes 
 
1  BASF is unusual among German firms in deciding in 2000-1 to sell its 
pharmaceutical interests because they lacked critical mass, whereas 
several diversified British firms exited pharmaceuticals earlier in the 
1990s for similar reasons.  
 
Boehringer Mannheim is an example of exit by a well-known name in the 
German pharmaceutical industry: it was acquired by the Swiss company, 
Roche, in 1997. 
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